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Abstract
Over the past few years, online service providers have started gathering increasing amounts of per-
sonal information to build user profiles and monetize them with advertisers and data brokers. Users have
little control of what information is processed and are often left with an all-or-nothing decision between
receiving free services or refusing to be profiled. This paper explores an alternative approach where
users only disclose an aggregate model – the “gist” – of their data. We aim to preserve data utility and
simultaneously provide user privacy. We show that this approach can be efficiently supported by letting
users contribute encrypted and differentially-private data to an aggregator. The aggregator combines en-
crypted contributions and can only extract an aggregate model of the underlying data. We evaluate our
framework on a dataset of 100,000 U.S. users obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau and show that (i) it
provides accurate aggregates with as little as 100 users, (ii) it generates revenue for both users and data
brokers, and (iii) its overhead is appreciably low.
1 Introduction
The digital footprint of Internet users is growing at an unprecedented pace, driven by the pervasiveness
of online interactions and large number of posts, likes, check-ins, and content shared everyday. This creates
invaluable sources of information that online service providers use to profile users and serve targeted adver-
tisement. This economic model, however, raises major privacy concerns [11, 16, 40] as advertisers might
excessively track users, data brokers might illegally market consumer profiles [45], and governments might
abuse their surveillance power [17, 18] by obtaining datasets collected for other purposes (i.e., monetiza-
tion). Consequently, consumer advocacy groups are promoting policies and legislations providing greater
control to users and more transparent collection practices [30, 40].
Along these lines, several efforts – such as OpenPDS, personal.com, Sellbox, and Handshake – advocate
a novel, user-centric paradigm: users store their personal information in “data vaults”, and directly manage
with whom to share their data. This approach has several advantages, namely, users maintain data ownership
(and may monetize their data), while data brokers and advertisers benefit from more accurate and detailed
personal information [26, 42]. Nevertheless, privacy still remains a challenge as users need to trust data
vaults operators and relinquish their profiles to advertisers [7, 38].
To address such concerns, the research community has proposed to maintain data vaults on user devices
and share data in a privacy-preserving way. Prior work can be grouped into three main categories: (1) serv-
ing ads locally, without revealing any information to advertisers/data brokers [19, 28, 41]; (2) relying on a
∗A preliminary version of this paper appears in the Proceedings of ESORICS 2014. This is the full version.
†Work done while authors were at PARC.
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trusted third party to anonymize user data [4, 35]; and (3) relying on a trusted third party for private user
data aggregation [2, 9, 10]. Unfortunately, these approaches suffer from several limitations. First, local-
ized methods prevent data brokers and advertisers from obtaining user statistics. Second, anonymization
techniques provide advertisers with significantly reduced data utility and are prone to re-identification at-
tacks [29]. Finally, existing private aggregation schemes rely on a trusted third party for differential privacy
(e.g., a proxy [10], a website [2], or mixes [9]; also, aggregation occurs after decryption, thus making it
possible to link contributions and users.
Motivated by the above challenges, this paper proposes a novel approach to privacy-preserving aggrega-
tion of user data. Rather than contributing data as-is, users combine their data into an aggregate model – the
“gist.” Intuitively, users contribute encrypted and differentially-private data to an aggregator that extracts a
statistical model of the underlying data (e.g., probability density function of the age of contributing users).
Our approach addresses issues with existing work in that it does not depend on a third-party for differen-
tial privacy, incurs low computational overhead, and addresses linkability issues between contributions and
users. Moreover, we propose a metric to dynamically value user statistics according to their inherent amount
of “valuable” information (i.e., sensitivity): for instance, aggregators can assess whether age statistics in a
group of participants are more sensitive than income statistics. To the best of our knowledge, our solution
provides the first privacy-preserving aggregation scheme for personal data monetization.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
1. We design a privacy-preserving framework for monetizing user data, where users trade an aggregate
of their data instead of actual values.
2. We define a measure of the sensitivity of different data aggregates. In particular, we adopt the
information-theoretic Jensen-Shannon divergence [24] to quantify the distance between the actual
distribution of a data attribute, and a distribution that does not reveal actionable information [15],
such as the uniform distribution.
3. We show how to rank aggregates based on their sensitivity, i.e., we design a dynamic valuation scheme
based on how much information an aggregate leaks.
We evaluate our privacy-preserving framework on a real, anonymized dataset of 100,000 US users (ob-
tained by the Census Bureau) with different types of attributes. Our results show that our framework (i)
provides accurate aggregates with as little as 100 participants, (ii) generates revenue for users and data
aggregators depending on the number of contributing users and sensitivity of attributes, and (iii) has low
computational overhead on user devices (0.3 ms for each user, independently of the number of participants).
Interestingly, we find that data brokers have an incentive to direct their investments on small groups of
users representative of a certain population. In summary, our approach provides a novel perspective to the
privacy-preserving monetization of personal data, and finds a successful balance between data accuracy for
advertisers, privacy protection for users, and incentives for data aggregators.
Paper Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section introduces the system
architecture and the problem statement. Then, Section 3 presents our framework and Section 4 reports on
our experimental evaluation. After reviewing related work in Section 5, we conclude the paper in Section 6.
2 System Architecture
This section introduces the problem definition and presents participating entities.
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Figure 1: System architecture and basic protocol. Users contribute encrypted profiles to the aggregator.
The aggregator combines encrypted profiles and obtains plaintext data models, which it monetizes with
customers.
2.1 Problem Statement
We consider a system comprised of three entities: A set of users U = {1, . . . , N}, a data aggregator A,
and a customer C. The system architecture is illustrated in Fig. 1. Customers query the data aggregator for
user information, while users contribute their personal information to the data aggregator. The aggregator
acts as a proxy between users and customers by aggregating (and monetizing) user data. The main goal
of this paper is to propose practical techniques to aggregate and monetize user personal data in a privacy-
preserving way, i.e., without revealing personal information to other users or third parties.
2.2 System Model
Users. We assume that users store a set of personal attributes such as age, gender, and preferences locally.
Each user i ∈ U maintains a profile vector pi = [xi,1, . . . , xi,K ], where xi,j ∈ D is the value of attribute j
and D is a suitable domain for j. For example, if j represents the age of user i, then xi,j ∈ {1, . . . ,Mj},
Mj = 120, and D ⊂ N.
In practice, users can generate their personal profiles manually, or leverage profiles maintained by third
parties. Several social networks allow subscribers to download their online profile. A Facebook profile, for
example, contains numerous Personally Identifiable Information (PII) items (such as age, gender, relation-
ships, location), preferences (movies, music, books, tv shows, brands), media (photos and videos) and social
interaction data (list of friends, wall posts, liked items).
Following the results of recent studies on user privacy attitudes [3, 7, 26], we assume that each user i
can specify a privacy-sensitivity value 0 ≤ λi,j ≤ 1 for each attribute j. A large λi,j indicates high privacy
sensitivity (i.e., lower willingness to disclose). In practice, λi,j can assume a limited number of discrete
values, which could represent the different levels of sensitivity according to Westin’s Privacy Indexes [22].
We assume that users want to monetize their profiles while preserving their privacy. For instance, users
may be willing to trade an aggregate of their online behavior, such as the frequency at which they visit
different categories of websites, rather than the exact time and URLs.
Finally, we assume that user devices can perform cryptographic operations consisting of multiplications,
exponentiations, and discrete logarithms.
Data Aggregator. A data aggregator A is an untrusted third-party that performs the following actions: (1) it
collects encrypted attributes from users, (2) it aggregates contributed attributes in a privacy-preserving way,
and (3) it monetizes users’ aggregates according to the amount of “valuable” information that each attribute
conveys.
We assume that users and A sign an agreement upon user registration that authorizes A to access the
aggregated results (but not users’ actual attributes), to monetize them with customers, and to take a share of
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the revenue from the sale. It also binds A to redistribute the rest of the revenue among contributing users.
Customer. We consider a customer C willing to obtain aggregate information about users and to pay for
it. C can have commercial contracts with multiple data brokers. Similarly, a data aggregator can have
contracts with multiple customers. C interacts with a data aggregator A and does not communicate directly
with users. C obtains available attributes, and initiates an aggregation by querying the data aggregator for
specific attributes.
2.3 Applications
The proposed system model is well-suited to many real-world scenarios, including market research and
online tracking use cases. For instance, consider a car dealer C that wants to assess user preferences for
car brands, their demographics, and income distributions. A data aggregator A might collect aggregate
information about a representative set of users U and monetize it with the car dealer C. Companies such as
Acxiom currently provide this service, but raise privacy concerns [39]. Our solution enables such companies
to collect aggregates of personal data instead of actual values and reward users for their participation.
Another example is that of an online publisher (e.g., a news website) C that wishes to know more about
its online readership [2]. In this case, the aggregator A is an online advertiser that collects information about
online users U and monetizes it with online publishers.
Finally, our proposed model can also be appealing to data aggregators in healthcare [12]. Healthcare
data is often fragmented in silos across different organizations and/or individuals. An healthcare aggregator
A can compile data from various sources and allow third parties C to buy access to the data. At the same
time, data contributors (U) receive a fraction of the revenue. Our approach thwarts privacy concerns and
helps with the pricing of contributed data.
2.4 Threat Model
In modeling security, we consider both passive and active adversaries.
Passive adversaries. Semi-honest (or honest-but-curious) passive adversaries monitor user communications
and try to infer the individual contributions made by other users. For instance, users may wish to obtain
attribute values of other users; similarly, data aggregators and customers may try to learn the values of the
attributes from aggregated results. A passive adversary executes the protocol correctly and in the correct
order, without interfering with inputs or manipulating the final result.
Active adversaries. Active (or malicious) adversaries can deviate from the intended execution of the pro-
tocol by inserting, modifying or erasing input or output data. For instance, a subset of malicious users may
collude with each other in order to obtain information about other (honest) users or to bias the result of the
aggregation. To achieve their goal, malicious users may also collude with either the data aggregator or with
the customer. Moreover, a malicious data aggregator may collude with a customer in order to obtain private
information about the user attributes.
3 Monetizing User Profiles with Privacy
We outline and formalize the data monetization framework, which consists of a protocol that is executed
between users U, a data aggregator A and a customer C. We first provide an intuitive description and then
detail each individual component.
4
3.1 High-Level Description
We propose a protocol where users trade personal attributes in a privacy-preserving way, in exchange for
(possibly) monetary retributions. Intuitively, there are two possible modes of implementations: interactive
and batch.
In interactive mode, a customer initiates a query about specific attributes and users. The aggregator
selects users matching the query, collects encrypted replies, computes aggregates, and monetizes them ac-
cording to a pricing function.
In batch mode, users send their encrypted profile, containing personal attributes, to the data broker.
The aggregator combines encrypted profiles, decrypts them, obtains aggregates for each attribute, and ranks
attributes based on the amount of “valuable” information they provide. A customer is then offered access to
specific attributes. Without loss of generality, hereafter we describe the interactive mode.
Initialization: The data aggregator A and users i ∈ U engage in a secure key establishment protocol to
obtain individual random secret keys sj , where s0 is only known to A and si (∀i ∈ U) is only known to user
i, such that s0 + s1 + . . .+ sN = 0 (this condition is required for the data aggregation described hereafter).
Any secure key establishment protocol or trusted dealer can be used in this phase to distribute the secret
keys, as long as the condition on their sum is respected. The initialization phase is the same as in [36]. Each
user i generates its profile vector pi ∈ DK containing personal attributes j ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
1. Customer Query: A customer queries the aggregator. The query contains information about the type
of aggregates and users. In practice, it could be formatted as an SQL query.
2. User Selection: The aggregator selects users based on the customer query. To do so, we consider
that users shared some basic information with the aggregator, such as their demographics. Another
option is for the aggregator to forward the customer query to users, and let users decide whether to
participate or not.
3. Aggregator Query: The aggregator forwards the customer’s query to the users, together with a public
feature extraction function f .
4. Feature Extraction: Each user i can optionally execute a public feature extraction function f :
DK → OL on pi, where L is the dimension of the output feature space O, thus resulting in a feature
vector fi. In our implementation, we consider a simple function that extracts the value of an attribute
and its square.
5. Encryption and Obfuscation: Each user adds noise to fi, obtaining f̂i, and encrypts it. Encryption
and obfuscation provide strong guarantees both in terms of data confidentiality and differential privacy
[13]. Each user sends the encrypted vector E(f̂i) to A.
6. Aggregation, Decryption, and Pricing: A combines all E(f̂i) and decrypts the result, generating a 2-
tuple (Vj ,Wj) ∈ R2 for each attribute j. These tuples are used to approximate the probability density
function of attributes across users. A uses (Vj ,Wj) to create a discrete sampled probability distribu-
tion function dNj for each attribute j. A then computes a distance measure dj = d(dNj , dUj) ∈ [0, 1]
between dNj and dUj , where dUj is a discrete uniform distribution in the interval [mj ,Mj ]. A
small/large distance corresponds to an attribute with low/high information “value”, as described later
in the text.
A determines the cost Cost(j) of each attribute j by taking into account both the distances dj , the
number of contributing users, and the price per attribute.
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7. Answer: A sends a set of 2-tuples {(dρz , Cost(ρz))}Kρz=1 to C, which selects aggregates to purchase.
After the purchase, A obtains a share of the total sale revenue and equally distributes the remainder to
users.
3.2 Detailed Description
We detail the functions and primitives for the aggregation and monetization of user data. In this paper,
we compute aggregates by estimating the probability density function (pdf ) of user attributes. We use the
Gaussian approximation to estimate pdfs for two reasons. First, existing work shows that this will lead to
precise aggregates with few users. The CLT [23, 34] states that the arithmetic mean of a sufficiently large
number of independent random variables, drawn from distributions of expected value µ and variance σ2,
will be approximately normally distributed N (µ, σ2). Second, a Gaussian pdf N is fully defined by two
parameters and thus we do not need additional coordination among users (after the initialization phase). For
information leakage ranking, we use a well-established information-theoretic distance function.
For conciseness, we focus on the description of privacy-preserving aggregation and pricing (phases 4 to
6, i.e., feature extraction, encryption, aggregation and ranking). With respect to the initialization and query
forwarding phases (1-3), our method is general enough and can be adapted to any specific implementation.
3.2.1 Phase 4-5: Feature Extraction and Encryption.
Each user i generates a profile vector pi = [xi,1, . . . , xi,K ]. Each attribute j takes value xi,j ∈
{mj , . . . ,Mj}, where mj ,Mj ∈ Zp are the minimum and maximum value. Note that as in [36], com-
putations are in cyclic group Zp of prime order p. The aggregator also chooses a generator g at random,
such that g ∈ Zp, and H is a Hash function. Remember that in practice, a user can derive pi either from an
existing online profile (e.g., Facebook) or by manually entering values xi,j . In our evaluation, we use values
from the U.S. Census Bureau [43, 44].
We consider a simple feature extraction f that consists in providing xj and computing x2j . Obviously,
other feature extraction method may contribute higher-order moments or simply combine attributes together
to obtain richer xj’s.
To guarantee (, δ)-Differential Privacy, each user i adds noise ri,j , oi,j to attribute values sampled from
a symmetric Geometric distribution according to Algorithm 1 in [36]. In particular, in the following we add
noise to both xi,j and x2i,j , as they will be subsequently combined to obliviously compute the parameters of
the model that underlies the actual data:
x̂i,j = xi,j + ri,j mod p
and
x̂i,j
(2) = x2i,j + oi,j mod p
where p is the prime order [36].
With x̂i,j and x̂i,j
(2), each user generates the following encrypted vectors (ci,bi):
ci =

ci,1
ci,2
...
ci,K
 =

gx̂i,1H(t)si
gx̂i,2H(t)si
...
gx̂i,KH(t)si
, bi =

bi,1
bi,2
...
bi,K
 =

gx̂i,1
(2)
H(t)si
gx̂i,2
(2)
H(t)si
...
gx̂i,K
(2)
H(t)si

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Each user i then sends (ci,bi) to A. Note that the encryption scheme guarantees that A is unable
to decrypt the vectors (ci,bi). However, thanks to its own secret share s0, A can decrypt aggregates as
explained hereafter.
3.2.2 Phase 6: Privacy-Preserving Aggregation and Pricing.
To compute the sample mean µ̂j and variance σ̂2j without having access to the individual values x̂i,j , x̂i,j
(2)
of any user i, A first computes intermediate 2-tuple (Vj ,Wj):
Vj = H(t)
s0ΠNi=1ci,j = H(t)
∑N
k=0 skg
∑N
i=1 x̂i,j = g
∑N
i=1 x̂i,j
Wj = H(t)
s0ΠNi=1bi,j = H(t)
∑N
k=0 skg
∑N
i=1 x̂i,j
(2)
= g
∑N
i=1 x̂i,j
(2)
To obtain (µ̂j , σ̂2j ), A takes the discrete logarithm base g of (Vj ,Wj):
µ̂j =
logg(Vj)
N
=
∑N
i=1 x̂i,j
N
σ̂2j =
logg(Wj)
N
− µ̂j2 =
∑N
i=1 x̂i,j
(2)
N
− µ̂j2
Finally, using the derived (µ̂j , σ̂2j ), A computes the Normal pdf approximation Nj ∼ N (µ̂j , σ̂2j ) for each
attribute j.
Ranking. In order to estimate the amount of “valuable” information (i.e., sensitivity) that each attribute
leaks, we propose to measure the distance (i.e., divergence) between the Normal approximation Nj and the
Uniform distribution U . This makes sense because divergence measures distance between distributions: By
comparing Nj to the Uniform, we measure how much information Nj leaks compared to the distribution U
that leaks the least amount of information [20]. This approach applies to a variety of computing scenarios.
For example, a related concept was studied in [15, 21] for measuring the “interestingness” of textual data by
comparing it to an expected model, usually with the Kullback-Liebler (KL) divergence.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to explore this approach in the context of information
privacy. Instead of the KL divergence, we rely on the Jensen-Shannon (JS) divergence for two reasons: (1)
JS is a symmetric and (2) bounded equivalent of the KL divergence. It is defined as:
JS(u, q) =
1
2
KL(u,m) +
1
2
KL(q,m) = H(
1
2
u+
1
2
q)− 1
2
H(u)− 1
2
H(q)
where m = u/2 + q/2 and H is the Shannon entropy. As JS is in [0, 1] (when using the logarithm base
2), it quantifies the relative distance between Nj and Uj , and also provides absolute comparisons with
distributions different from the uniform.
As JS operates on discrete values, A must first discretize distributions Nj and Uj . Given the knowledge
of intervals {mj , . . . ,Mj} for each attribute j, we can use Riemann’s centered sum to approximate a definite
integral, where the number of approximation bins is related to the accuracy of the approximation. We choose
the number of bins to be Mj −mj , and thus guarantee a bin width of 1. We approximateNj by the discrete
random variable dNj with the following probability mass function:
Pr(dNj) =

Pr(xj = mj)
Pr(xj = mj + 1)
...
Pr(xj = Mj)
 =

pdfj(
1
2(mj +mj − 1))
pdfj(
1
2(mj + 1 +mj))
...
pdfj(
1
2(Mj +Mj − 1))

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where pdfj is the probability density function Nj and xj ∈ {mj , . . . ,Mj}. We then normalize Pr(dNj)
such that
∑
k Pr(xj = k) = 1, for each j. For the uniform distribution Uj , the discretization to dUj is
straightforward, i.e., Pr(dUj) = (1/(Mj −mj), . . . , 1/(Mj −mj))T , where dim(dUj) = Mj −mj .
A can now compute distances dj = JS(dNj , dUj) ∈ [0, 1] and rank attributes in increasing order of
information leakage such that dρ1 ≤ dρ2 ≤ . . . ≤ dρK , where ρ1 = arg minj dj and ρz (for 2 ≤ z ≤ K) are
defined as ρz = arg minj 6={ρk}z−1k=1(dj)
At this point, A computed the 3-tuple (dρj , µ̂j , σ̂2j ) for each attribute j. Each user i can now decide
whether it is comfortable sharing attribute j given distance dj and privacy sensitivity λi,j . To do so, each
user i sends λi,j to A for comparison. A then checks which users are willing to share each attribute j
and updates the ratio γj = Sj/N , where Sj is the number of users that are comfortable sharing, i.e.,
Sj = |{i ∈ U s.t. dj ≤ 1 − λi,j}|. In practice, A could then use the majority rule to decide whether or not
to monetize attribute j.
Pricing. After this ranking phase, the data broker A concludes the process with the pricing and revenue
phases. Prior work shows that users assign unique monetary value to different types of attributes depending
on several factors, such as offline/online activities [7], type of third-parties involved [7], privacy sensitiv-
ity [3], amount of details and fairness [26].
We measure the value of aggregates depending on their sensitivity, the number of contributing users,
and the cost of each attribute. Without loss of generality, we estimate the value of an aggregate j using the
following linear model:
Cost(j) = Price(j) · dj ·N
where Price(j) is the monetary value that users assign to attribute j. Without loss of generality, we assume
in our pricing scheme a relative value of 1 for each attribute. Existing work discussed the value of user
attributes, and estimated a large range from $ 0.0005 to $33 [7, 31] highlighting the difficulty in determining
a fixed price. In practice, this is likely to change depending on the monetization scenario.
A then sends the set of 2-tuples {(dρz , Cost(ρz))}Kρz=1 to C. Based on the tuples, C selects the set P of
attributes it wishes to purchase. After the purchase is complete, A re-distributes revenue R among users and
itself, according to the agreement stipulated with the users upon their first registration with A.
We consider a standard revenue sharing monetization scheme, where the revenue is split among users
and the data aggregator (i.e., aggregator takes commissions):
R(A) =
∑
j∈P
ωj · Cost(j), R(i) = 1
N
∑
j∈P
(1− ωj) · Cost(j), ∀i ∈ U
where ωj is the commission percentage of A. This system is popular in existing aggregating schemes [12],
credit-card payments, and online stores (e.g., iOS App Store). We assume a fixed ωj for each attribute j.
4 Evaluation
To test the relevance and the practicality of our privacy-preserving monetization solution, we measure
the quality of aggregates, the overhead, and generated revenue. In particular, we study how the number of
protocol participants and their privacy sensitivities affect the accuracy of the Gaussian approximations, the
computational performance, the amount of information leaked for each attribute, and revenue.
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  Number of randomly selected users in the dataset 
  10 100 1k 10k 50k 100k 
In
co
m
e µ 6.50 9.72 10.30 10.87 10.83 10.89 
σ 19.17 18.70 20.04 17.05 16.72 16.52 
(mj, Mj) (1, 10) (1, 15) (1, 15) (1, 16) (1, 16) (1, 16) 
E
du
c.
 µ 5.70 7.23 10.29 10.38 10.21 10.18 
σ 15.57 7.07 7.96 7.68 7.73 7.63 
(mj, Mj) (1, 9) (1, 12) (1, 15) (1, 16) (1, 16) (1, 16) 
A
ge
 µ 38.10 35.40 41.91 42.44 41.49 39.79 
σ 252.54 502.79 563.32 546.40 553.68 539.60 
(mj, Mj) (11, 67) (1, 85) (0, 85) (0, 85) (0, 85) (0, 85) 
Table 1: Summary of the U.S. Census dataset used for the evaluation. We considered three types of attributes
(level of income, education and age), which reflect different types of sample distributions (as shown in Fig.
2).
4.1 Setup
We consider secret shares in Zp where p is a 1024 bits modulus, the number of users N ∈ [10, 100000],
and each user i with profile pi. We implemented our privacy-preserving protocol in Java, and rely on public
libraries for secret key initialization, for multi-threading decryption, and on the MALLET [27] package for
computation of the JS divergence.
We run our experiments on a machine equipped with Mac OSX 10.8.3, dual-core Core i5 processor, 2.53
GHz, and 8 GB RAM. Measurements up to 100 users are averaged over 300 iterations, and the rest (from
1k to 100k users) are averaged over 3 iterations due to large simulation times.
We populate user profiles with U.S. Census Bureau information [43, 44]: We obtained anonymized
offline and online attributes about 100,000 people. We pre-processed the acquired data by removing incom-
plete profiles (i.e., some respondents prefer not to reveal specific attributes).
Without loss of generality, we focus on three types of offline attributes: Yearly income level, education
level and age. We selected these attributes because (1) a recent study [7] shows that these attributes have
high monetary value (and thus privacy sensitivity), and (2) they have significantly different distributions
across users. This allows us to compare retribution models, and measure the accuracy of the Gaussian
approximation for a variety of distributions.
Table 1 shows the mean and standard deviation for the three considered attributes with a varying number
of users. Note that the provided values for income and education use a specific scale defined by the Census
Bureau. For example, a value of 1 and 16 for education correspond to “Less than 1st grade” and “Doctorate”,
respectively.
We could consider other types of attributes as well, such as internet, music and video preferences from
alternative sources, such as Yahoo Webscope [47]. Although an exhaustive comparison of the monetization
of all different attributes is an exciting perspective, it is out of the scope of this paper and we leave this for
future work.
4.2 Results
We evaluate four aspects of our privacy-preserving scheme: model accuracy, information leakage, over-
head and pricing.
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(a) Attribute income, sampled from 100 users (left), 1k users (middle) and 100k users (right).
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(b) Attribute education, sampled from 100 users (left), 1k users (middle) and 100k users (right).
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(c) Attribute age, sampled from 100 users (left), 1k users (middle) and 100k users (right).
Figure 2: Gaussian approximation vs. actual distribution for each considered attribute.
4.2.1 Model Accuracy
In our proposal, we approximate empirical probability de sity functions with Gaussian distributions.
The accuracy of approximations is important to assess the relevance of derived data models. In Fig. 2, we
co pare the actual distribution of each attribute with their respective Gaussian approximation and vary the
nu ber of users from 100 to 100,000. Note that in order to compare probabilities over the domain [mj ,Mj ],
we scaled both the actual distribution and the Gaussian approximation such that their respective sums over
that domain are qual to one. We observe that, visually, the Gaussian approximation captures general trends
in the actual dat .
We measure the accuracy of the Gaussian approxi ation in more details with the JS diverg nce (Fig.
3a). We observe that with 100 users, the approximation reaches a plateau for education, whereas income
and age require 1k users to converge. For the two latter attributes, the approximation accuracy triples when
i c easing from 100 to 1k users. Moreover, s the n mber of user increases, the fit of the Gaussian model
for income and age is two times better (JS of 0.05 bits) than for education (JS of 0.1 bits). The main reason
is that education has more data points with large differences between actual and approximated distributions
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(a) Divergence between the Gaussian approxima-
tion and the actual distribution of each attribute j,
computed as the JS(dNj ,Actualj). Lower values
indicate better accuracy.
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(b) Information leakage for each type of at-
tribute j (income, education and age), defined as
JS(dNj , dUj). Lower values indicate smaller in-
formation leaks.
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i ∈ U and the data aggregator A, assuming that an
attribute is valued at 1.
Figure 3: Results of the evaluation of the proposed framework on the U.S. Census dataset.
than income and age (as shown in Fig. 2).
These results indicate that, for non-uniform distributions, the Gaussian approximation is accurate with a
relatively small number of users (about 100). It is interesting to study this result in light of the Central Limit
Theorem (CLT). Remember that the CLT states that the arithmetic mean of a sufficiently large number of
variables will tend to be normally distributed. In other words, a Gaussian approximation quickly converges
to the original distribution and this confirms the validity of our experiments. This also means that C can
obtain accurate models even if it requests aggregates about small groups of users. In other words, collecting
data about more than 1k users does not significantly improve the accuracy of approximations, even for more
extreme distributions.
4.2.2 Information Leakage
We compare the divergence between Gaussian approximations and uniform distributions to measure the
information leakage of different attributes. Fig. 3b shows the sensitivity for each attribute with a varying
number of users. We observe that the amount of information leakage stabilizes for all attributes after a given
11
number of participants. In particular, education and age reach a maximum information leakage with 1k
users, whereas 10k users are required for income to achieve the same leakage.
Overall, we observe that education is by far the attribute with the largest distance to the uniform distri-
bution, and therefore arguably the most valuable one. In comparison, Income and age are 50% and 75% less
“revealing”. Information leakage for age decreases from 100 to 1k users, as age distribution in our dataset
tends towards a uniform distribution. In contrast, education and income are significantly different from a
uniform distribution. An important observation is that the amount of valuable information does not increase
monotonically with the number of users: For age, it decreases by 30% when the number of users increases
from 100 to 1k, and for education it decreases by 3% when transitioning from 10k to 50k users.
These findings show that larger user samples do not necessarily provide better discriminating features.
This also shows that users should not decide whether to participate in our protocol solely based on a fixed
threshold over total participants, as this may prove to leak slightly more private information.
4.2.3 Overhead
We measure the computation overhead for both users and the data broker. For each user, we find that
one execution of the protocol requires 0.284 ms (excluding communication delays), out of which 0.01 ms
are spent for the profile generation, 0.024 ms for the feature extraction, 0.026 ms for the differential-privacy
noise addition, and 0.224 ms for encryption of the noisy attribute. In general, user profiles are not subject to
change within short time intervals, thus suggesting that user-side operations could be executed on resource-
constrained devices such as mobile phones.
From Fig. 3c, observe that the data broker requires about one second to complete its phases when there
are only 10 users, 1.5 min with 100 users, 15 min with 1k users, and 27.7 h for 100k users. Note, however,
that running times can be remarkably reduced using algorithmic optimization and parallelization, which
is part of our future work. In our results, decryption is the most time-consuming operation for the data
broker as it incurs (O(N ·Mj)): this could be reduced to O(
√
N ·Mj) by using the Pollard’s Rho method
for computing the discrete logarithm [33]. Also, decryption can be speedup up by splitting decryption
operations across multiple machines (i.e., the underlying algorithm is highly-parallelizable).
4.2.4 Pricing
Recall that the price of an attribute aggregate depends on the number of contributing users, the amount
of information leakage, and the cost of the attribute. We consider that each attribute j has a unit cost of 1
and the data broker takes a commission ωj . We consider three types of privacy sensitivities λ: (i) a uniform
random distribution of privacy sensitivities λi,j for each user i and for each attribute j, (ii) an individual
privacy sensitivity λi for each user (same across different attributes), and (iii) an all-share scenario (λi = 0
and all users contribute). The commission percentage is set to ωj = ω = 0.1.
Fig. 3d shows the average revenue generated from one attribute by the data broker and by users. We
observe that user revenue is small and does not increase with the number of participants. In contrast, the
data broker revenue increases linearly with the number of participants. In terms of privacy sensitivities, we
observe that with higher privacy sensitivities (λi > 0), fewer users contribute, thus generating lower revenue
overall and per user. For example, users start earning revenue with 10 participants in the all-share scenario,
but more users are required to start generating revenue if users adopt higher privacy sensitivities.
We observe that users are incentivized to participate as they earn some revenue (rather than not bene-
fiting at all), but the generated revenue does not generate significant income, thus, it might encourage user
participation from “biased” demographics (e.g., similar to Amazon Mechanical Turk). In contrast, the data
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broker has incentives to attract more users, as it revenue increases with the number of participants. However,
customers are incentivized to select fewer users because cost increases with the number of users, and 100
users provide as good an aggregate as 1000 users. This is an intriguing result, as it encourages customers to
focus on small groups of users representative of a certain population category.
4.3 Security
Passive adversaries. To ensure privacy of the personal user attributes, our framework relies on the security
of the underlying encryption and differential-privacy methods presented in [36]. Hence, no passive adversary
(a user participating in the monetization protocol, the data aggregator or an external party not involved in
the protocol) can learn any of the user attributes, assuming that the key setup phase has been performed
correctly and that a suitable algebraic group (satisfying the DDH assumption) with a large enough prime
order (1024 bits or more) has been chosen.
Active adversaries. As per [36], our framework is resistant to collusion attacks among users and between
a subset of users and the data broker, as each user i encrypts its attribute values with a unique and secret
key si. However, pollution attacks, which try to manipulate the aggregated result by encrypting out-of-
scope values, can affect the aggregate result of our protocol. Nevertheless, such attacks can be mitigated
by including, in addition to encryption, range checks based on efficient (non-interactive) zero-knowledge
proofs of knowledge [5, 6, 25]: each user could submit, in addition to the encrypted values, a proof that such
values are indeed in the plausible range specified by the data aggregator. However, even within a specific
range, a user can manipulate its contributed value and thus affect the aggregate. Although nudging users to
reveal their true attribute value is an important challenge, it is outside of the scope of this paper.
5 Related Work
Our work builds upon two main domains, in order to provide the privacy and incentives for the users
and data aggregators: (1) privacy-preserving aggregation [14, 36, 37, 46], and (2) privacy-preserving mone-
tization of user profiles [4, 19, 35, 41]. Hereafter we discuss these two sets of works.
5.1 Privacy-Preserving Aggregation
Erkin and Tsudik [14] design a method to perform privacy-preserving data aggregation in the smart grid.
Smart meters jointly establish secret keys without having to rely on a trusted third party, and mask individual
readings using a modified version of the Paillier encryption scheme [32]. The aggregator then computes the
sum of all readings without seeing individual values. Smart meters must communicate with each other, thus
limiting this proposal to online settings. Shi et al. [37] compute the sum of different inputs based on data
slicing and mixing with other users, but have the same limitation: all participants must actively communicate
with each other during the aggregation.
Another line of work [9, 10] introduces privacy-preserving aggregation by combining homomorphic
encryption and differential privacy, i.e., users encrypt their data with the customer public key and send it
to a trusted aggregator. The aggregator adds differential noise to encrypted values (using the homomorphic
property), and forwards the result to the customer. The customer decrypts contributions and computes
desired aggregates. These proposals, however, suffer from a number of shortcomings as: (i) they rely on a
trusted third party for differential privacy; (ii) they require at least one public key operation per single bit
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of user input, and one kilobit of data per single bit of user answer, or rely on XOR encryption; and (iii)
contributions are linkable to users as aggregation occurs after decryption.
The work by Shi et al. [36] supports computing the sum of different inputs in a privacy-preserving
fashion, without requiring communication among users, nor repeated interactions with a third party. It also
provides differential privacy guarantees in presence of malicious users, and establishes an upper bound on
the error induced by the additive noise. This work formally shows that a Geometric distribution provides
(, δ)-differential privacy (DD) in Zp. We extend the construction in [36] to support the privacy-preserving
computation of probability distributions (in addition to sums). Intuitively, we use the proposed technique
to compute the parameters of Gaussian approximations in a privacy-preserving way. As we maintain the
same security assumptions, our framework preserves provable privacy properties. As part of future work,
we intend to explore the properties of regression modeling and privacy-preserving computation of regression
parameters [1, 46], in addition to distributions.
5.2 Privacy-Preserving Monetization
Previous work investigated two main approaches to privacy-preserving Online Behavioral Advertise-
ment (OBA). The first approach minimizes the data shared with third parties, by introducing local user pro-
file generation, categorization, and ad selection [2, 19, 28, 41]. The second approach relies on anonymizing
proxies to shield users’ behavioral data from third parties, until users agree to sell their data [4, 35].
Toubiana et al. [41] propose to let users maintain browsing profiles on their device and match ads with
user profiles, based on a cosine-similarity measure between visited websites meta-data (title, URL, tags) and
ad categories. Users receive a large number of ads, select appropriate ones, and share selected ads with ad
providers (not revealing visited websites nor user details). Guha et al. [19] propose to do the ad matching
with an anonymization proxy instead. Although the cost of such system is estimated at $0.01/user per year,
such solution demands significant changes from web browser vendors and online advertisers. Akkus et al.
propose to let users rely on the website publisher to anonymize their browsing patterns vis-a`-vis the ad-
provider. Their protocol introduces significant overhead: The website publisher must repeatedly interact
with each visitor and forward encrypted messages to the ad-provider.
Instead of local profiles, Riederer et al. [35] propose a fully centralized approach, where an anonymiza-
tion proxy mediates interactions between users and website publishers. The proxy releases the mapping
between IP addresses and long-term user identifiers only after users agree to sell their data to a customer,
thus allowing the customer to link different visits by the same users. However, users have to entrust a third
party with their personal information.
In contrast, our framework does not rely on any additional user-side software, does not impose compu-
tationally expensive cryptographic computation on user devices, and prevents the customer from learning
individual user data.
6 Conclusion
As the amount and sensitivity of personal data shared with service providers increases, so do privacy
concerns. Users usually have little control over what information is processed by service providers and how
it is monetized with advertisers. Our work offers a privacy-preserving alternative where users only disclose
an aggregate model of their profiles, by means of encrypted and differentially private contributions. Our
solution tackles trust and incentive challenges: rather than selling data as-is, users trade a model of their
data. Users also monetize their profiles by dynamically assessing the value of data aggregates. To this
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end, we use an information-theoretic measure to compute the amount of valuable information provided to
advertisers.
We evaluate our framework on a real and anonymized dataset with more than 100,000 users (obtained
from the U.S. Census Bureau) and show, with an experimental evaluation, that our solution (i) provides
accurate aggregates with as little as 100 users, (ii) introduces low overhead for both users (less than 1ms on
commodity hardware) and data aggregators, and (iii) generates revenue for both users and aggregators.
As part of future work, we plan to enhance our scheme with new features, including fault-tolerant ag-
gregation [8], which can be integrated in order to allow users to join/leave dynamically without disrupting
the scheme. Also, range checks for the encrypted user attributes, based on efficient zero-knowledge proofs,
could thwart active pollution attacks. Users could also contribute higher order moments (e.g., x3 or x4) for
the aggregator to obtain more precise approximations using moment-generating functions (an alternative to
pdfs). Finally, we intend to investigate schemes for targeting ads to users contributing data to the aggre-
gation, by allowing the aggregator to select specific subgroups of users according to the customer’s target
population.
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